The Gulf’s water crisis: Why cooperation is crucial — and complicated

On June 19, false reports of an Israeli strike on Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant sparked alarm across the Gulf. Though denied by Israeli officials, the claim traces back to a warning from Qatar’s prime minister of a potential catastrophe in the event of nuclear contamination — no water, no food, no life — due to the Gulf’s reliance on desalinated seawater. Gulf governments moved quickly to reassure the public that no radiation had been detected, but the episode underscored the region’s growing sense of vulnerability. A regional approach to water security could help to mitigate such risks.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was founded on the principle of regional cooperation to address shared challenges. Yet, despite this spirit of collaboration, one of the region’s most pressing challenges — water scarcity — has largely remained a national rather than a collective concern. With all GCC members except Oman classified as extremely water-scarce, and water needs met largely through energy-intensive desalination, the region faces mounting threats from rising demand, climate change, and geopolitical risk. This article explores the missed opportunities for regional water cooperation, the reasons behind this fragmented governance, and the strategic case for a united response.

The threat of water (in)security 

Whether viewed through the lens of traditional state security or the broader framework of human security, more extensive regional collaboration on water issues across the GCC is not only desirable, but also increasingly urgent. As climate risks intensify, infrastructure vulnerabilities deepen, and political uncertainties persist, the imperative for collective action is becoming harder to ignore.

The Gulf region collectively faces a serious water security challenge, relying heavily on non-renewable sources such as fossil groundwater and desalinated water, which together account for over 90% of the region’s overall water resources. Groundwater remains the main water resource across much of the region, although desalination plays an increasingly important role and is already the primary source of water for some Gulf states. 

As the supply of groundwater continues to deteriorate and it becomes a less dependable water source, desalination is increasingly seen by regional governments as the solution. Gulf countries are the most desalination-dependent nations in the world, collectively producing around 40% of the world’s desalinated water, with their capacity expected to double by 2030.

However, relying on desalination as the primary solution presents several problems. First, it is highly energy-intensive, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in energy prices and supply. Although ongoing efforts aim to develop technologies that reduce its energy consumption, the process remains costly and carbon-intensive. Furthermore, because most desalination plants rely on seawater, they are typically located along coastlines, making them susceptible to the impacts of sea level rise and coastal hazards. 

From a traditional security perspective, the Gulf’s heavy reliance on centralized desalination infrastructure presents a clear strategic vulnerability. These facilities, many of which are situated along low-lying coastal zones, face growing threats of potential military or cyberattacks. Historical precedents, such as the deliberate targeting of water infrastructure during the Gulf War in 1990-91, highlight just how exposed these systems are during periods of conflict. 

In addition to security concerns, desalination has significant environmental drawbacks. The Arabian Gulf is already experiencing the impact of increased salinity from brine discharge, which harms marine ecosystems. Additionally, desalination is energy-intensive and contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, which are a major driver of air pollution. As a result, Gulf countries experience significant air quality challenges.

While conventional water resources deteriorate, it is critical that Gulf countries do not rely solely on desalination. It cannot serve as a complete solution due to its high costs, environmental impacts, and strategic vulnerabilities — all of which pose risks to long-term water security.

In addition to the deterioration of water resources and the limitations of desalination, perhaps the most pressing issue for water security in the Gulf is the astonishing rise in demand, which will likely lead to an increased reliance on either further desalination or the continued over-extraction of groundwater, which is expected to run out between the years 2078 and 2108. Annual water use in the Gulf region increased from 6 billion cubic meters in the 1980s to approximately 28.5 billion cubic meters in 2020. Forecasts suggest water demand will hit approximately 33.7 billion cubic meters annually by 2050. This poses a major threat to regional water security. 

These are the conventional approaches to water security, highlighting the region’s vulnerability. At the same time, water security must also be understood through the lens of human security, directly linked to public health, food systems, and societal stability. Climate change is placing extraordinary stress on water availability and quality in the Gulf, with implications for everything from agriculture to disease prevention. Without integrated planning and shared emergency reserves, individual states face heightened risks from technical failures or environmental shocks. 

Recent events — from the Israel-Iran war to the Qatar diplomatic crisis — have demonstrated how quickly national responses can be overwhelmed in the absence of regional solidarity. What is clear is that enhanced cooperation on water issues is critical.

Despite shared vulnerabilities and common interests, GCC states have made only limited progress toward a unified water strategy. A range of persistent impediments — both structural and political — has hindered the development of integrated frameworks. 

For example, plans to unify desalination plants across the region collapsed after years of discussion. Similarly, the GCC Unified Water Strategy, once praised as a significant step forward in shaping regional water policy, has had limited impact. Although it outlined important goals, such as the unification of water tariffs scheduled for 2018, these have not been realized — highlighting the ongoing struggle to achieve water unification.

Another critical issue is the absence of formal agreements on transboundary water governance, despite the existence of several shared groundwater aquifers in the region. Notable examples include the Umm er Radhuma-Dammam Aquifer, shared by Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, as well as the Neogene Aquifer, which is shared between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. International examples clearly demonstrate the importance of transboundary water agreements in mitigating conflict and ensuring sustainable resource management. Furthermore, no Gulf state — except Qatar — has ratified the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, highlighting the near-total absence of engagement with this crucial aspect of water governance. As such, enhanced cooperation in this area is not only necessary but increasingly urgent. The limitations in regional cooperation pose a significant threat to water security in the Gulf, whether it involves sharing aquifers or other resources. 

Barriers to water cooperation among Gulf countries 

National sovereignty remains one of the most deeply rooted and consequential barriers to cooperation. Across the GCC, water is treated not only as a development issue but as a core matter of national security. As a result, states are reluctant to harmonize water policies or pool control over what are viewed as sovereign strategic resources. This securitization of water makes joint governance politically unpalatable and technically difficult. Efforts to establish cross-border water transfer systems or regional storage facilities are often rejected out of fear they might expose countries to external leverage or leave them vulnerable in times of crisis. For countries that import nearly all their food and rely heavily on energy-intensive desalination, water autonomy is tightly linked to regime stability and resilience.

Equally problematic is the persistence of political sensitivities and lingering distrust among member states. The 2017-21 diplomatic crisis — during which Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed ties with Qatar — exposed deep fault lines within the GCC and badly eroded trust in shared resource management. Even though diplomatic ties have since been restored, mistrust lingers. Water, as a critical and sensitive resource, remains a domain where states are particularly hesitant to pursue interdependence. Long-standing rivalries — such as the growing strategic competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over regional leadership, economic diversification models, and infrastructure influence — further complicate attempts at coordinated planning.

Compounding these political and strategic obstacles are several institutional and technical challenges that render integration both administratively cumbersome and economically less compelling. One major impediment is the weakness of enforcement mechanisms. Commitments at the GCC level are generally non-binding and implementation is inconsistent, owing to a lack of central authority or enforcement tools. In practice, coordination is left to ministerial-level platforms with limited institutional heft, making policy sporadic and follow-through uneven.

The GCC Secretariat Council lacks enforcement mechanisms, and any agreement reached is fully dependent on the contracting states to decide on implementation. All Gulf states have the autonomy to enforce regional agreements based on their own discretion and can fail to implement them without accountability. As a result, implementation hinges on the goodwill of individual governments — an increasingly unsustainable and unreliable model in today’s complex political and environmental context. This reliance on voluntary compliance significantly weakens the prospects for serious, sustained cooperation.

Another key factor dampening momentum toward integration is the declining economic appeal of regional water transfers. The cost of desalination has dropped significantly over the past decade, making national-level desalination plants more attractive than constructing costly, politically complex cross-border pipelines. This reduced cost differential has undermined the strategic rationale for water interdependence.

Moreover, the benefits of water integration are asymmetrically distributed. While regional pipelines are technically feasible, as demonstrated by infrastructure such as the Turkey-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus water pipeline, they would disproportionately benefit smaller inner Gulf states like Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. These countries are more vulnerable to supply disruptions, particularly in the event of maritime blockages or accidents in the Gulf. 

By contrast, Oman and Saudi Arabia enjoy access to other seas and receive comparatively more precipitation, giving them greater resilience and less dependence on shared infrastructure. Given this asymmetry, the more at-risk yet financially capable states have pursued unilateral solutions. For instance, the UAE is developing the Liwa Desert Strategic Water Reserve, while Qatar is working to expand its Water Security Mega Reservoirs. These megaprojects are designed to enhance national autonomy rather than foster regional interdependence.

Cost-sharing and pricing misalignments also hinder integration. A common water grid would necessitate harmonizing tariffs and subsidies across countries that have very different domestic pricing regimes. Water in the region is heavily subsidized, often regarded as a public entitlement, and any attempt to unify pricing structures would face substantial political resistance and raise issues of fairness and cost allocation.

Finally, the growing adoption of alternative supply strategies has reduced the perceived urgency of a collective approach. Many states are now advancing wastewater reuse and turning to marginal-quality water for agriculture, methods that allow for incremental self-sufficiency. These innovations enable countries to augment supplies independently and avoid the administrative burden and political challenges associated with collective action. Multiple sources indicate that the scalability of wastewater reuse and the use of marginal-quality water for agriculture is technically feasible and promising, though challenges such as cost, public perception, and regulatory frameworks remain.

Such pathways are especially appealing in today’s climate of fragile intra-GCC trust, where even well-intentioned coordination can sometimes be viewed with suspicion, particularly in the case of relations between Qatar and either Saudi Arabia or the UAE.

Taken together, these challenges explain why, despite shared vulnerabilities, GCC states continue to prioritize fragmented national strategies over meaningful regional integration when it comes to water security.

The case for regional water collaboration 

It is evident that major impediments continue to block meaningful regional-level water integration across the Gulf, but the benefits of cooperation far outweigh these challenges. The argument here is not that regional water cooperation simply offers a more secure water future for the Gulf region; rather, it is urgent and necessary to safeguard, not just promote, long-term water security.

First, in the context of transboundary water resources, this urgency must be addressed. In a world where water conflicts have been evident for years and given the broader context of political and environmental instability across the Middle East and North Africa region, it is crucial for the remaining Gulf countries to follow Qatar’s lead and ratify the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. The ratification of this Convention will serve as a neutral legal basis for handling disputes, overextraction, joint management, and environmental protection, thereby supporting both climate resilience and water security, improving regional stability, and committing Gulf states to international water law while reducing chances of regional tensions over future water stress, and turning potential flashpoints into opportunities for cooperation.

This, in turn, must be followed by the establishment of a binding, GCC-wide regional water agreement — one that guarantees fair, just, and secure access to shared aquifers, and that adheres to the core principles of the 1997 Convention. These include equitable and reasonable use, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the duty to cooperate. Such a framework would be essential for long-term water security in an already extremely water-scarce region. In the face of climate change and increasing water stress, a rules-based cooperative structure would serve as a cornerstone for peaceful collaboration, obligating countries to share water resources without resorting to conflict and laying the foundation for long-term regional stability and resilience.

Second, a regionally integrated desalination grid capable of redistributing water during disruptions could act as a force multiplier for resilience. It would also provide a tangible basis for coordinated emergency planning, infrastructure protection, and mutual assistance. While desalination may currently be less economically feasible when pursued individually, and a regional grid involves higher upfront infrastructure costs, its strategic value lies in its long-term collective benefits. 

As with the GCC electricity grid initiative, which has already been extended to Iraq, a shared desalination grid could be even more vital, given the central role of water in Gulf stability. In the face of the climate crisis, and in scenarios of water shortages triggered by extreme temperatures, which have already been experienced in the region, as well as natural disasters or cyberattacks, an interconnected water supply would function as a mutual backup system, helping to mitigate the risk of critical shortages across all six Gulf states.

Circling back to the Iran-Israel conflict, a regional desalination grid could help protect the Gulf from escalating tensions and the risk of nuclear contamination in the Arabian Gulf. A network stretching from Oman’s Indian Ocean coast to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea could provide a critical safeguard for states like Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait.

Additionally, such a grid could support the sharing of expertise and renewable-powered desalination technologies. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman — already leaders in this field — could help extend these innovations across the region. Paired with an integrated energy-sharing mechanism, this approach would lower economic costs while reducing carbon emissions, advancing both water and climate security in the Gulf.

Finally, a cooperative framework for water governance would not only enhance the region’s capacity to protect its populations but also help insulate water policy from the political rivalries that too often derail collaboration. It is critical to understand that the GCC has already begun moving away from centralized state-led models of water governance. Developments such as the initial public offering of government entities like the Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA), and the growing role of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in operating and building desalination plants are indicative of this shift. 

In this evolving context, a unified regional framework for water governance would significantly boost investor confidence by offering harmonized regulations and long-term policy stability. This would directly support the region’s privatization goals in the water sector and attract cross-border investment. Ultimately, by encouraging private sector involvement and improving efficiency, a coordinated framework would reduce the heavy fiscal burden currently borne by individual states, thereby supporting broader goals of economic diversification.  

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the long-term benefits of regional water cooperation in the Gulf are both clear and compelling. From enhanced water security and climate resilience to increased investor confidence and reduced fiscal strain, a unified approach offers broad and lasting returns. Effective policy coordination across the GCC can amplify these advantages, creating shared frameworks, harmonized regulations, and integrated infrastructure that collectively strengthen regional water security.

In contrast, the cost of fragmented, unilateral approaches is rising — from duplicated investments and inconsistent crisis responses to missed opportunities for technological innovation. Without regional cooperation, the Gulf states remain more exposed to conflict, nuclear risks, and disruptions to already scarce water supplies. Collective action offers a more secure path forward.

In a region facing mounting climate pressures and water-related risks, the price of going it alone is simply too high. Now is the time for Gulf countries to overcome legacy barriers and commit to a forward-looking model of cooperation. The future of water security in the region depends on it.

 

Naser Alsayed is a doctoral researcher at SOAS University of London, specializing in natural resource governance, environmental policy, and climate change across the Gulf and Global South. He is a Policy Fellow at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation and the Rihla Initiative, focusing on green economic growth and resource management in these regions.

John Calabrese is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI) and book review editor for The Middle East Journal. 

Photo by Fayez Nureldine/AFP via Getty Images